This article analyses the practice of horizontal agreement assessment in accordance with its impact on competition. The following research is based on analysis of scientific literature, current provisions of European Union and national legal acts, as well as official positions of the European Commission (hereinafter -EC) and national authorities.
INTRODUCTION
According to the Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (hereinafter -TFEU), as incompatible with the internal market, all agreements shall be prohibited between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market. 1 Further, it provides an exemplary list of agreements which should be prohibited in accordance with the main rule. Nevertheless, agreements considered harmful for competition can be Notice. Often they just mention the existence of exemption, such as in the work of Martin A. Carree, Andrea Günster, and Maarten Pieter Schinkel. 5 Almost the same can be said about Lithuanian legal specialists. Daivis Švirinas 6 and Irmantas minimis provisions? This article seeks to bring clarity to these issues.
The assessment results determine the agreement's validity and the consequences of its maintenance or abolishment; that is why it is so important to assess agreements properly. Therefore the aim of the research is to analyze and evaluate the current process of horizontal agreement assessments in accordance with de minimis doctrine and to give proposals concerning current assessment scheme(s).
HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS THAT HAVE ONLY MINOR IMPORTANCE

ON COMPETITION
The institution of agreements of minor importance for competition in European competition law appeared four decades ago. The basis for them is the European Court of Justice (hereinafter -ECJ) decision in the Völk v Vervaecke case in 1969:
Consequently an agreement falls outside the prohibition in Article 85 when it has only an insignificant effect on the markets, taking into account the weak position which the persons concerned have on the market of the product in question.
Thus an exclusive dealing agreement, even with absolute territorial protection, may, having regard to the weak position of the persons concerned on the market in the products in question in the area covered by the absolute protection, escape the prohibition laid down in Article 85(1). . The detailed analysis of national practice 21 allows us to state that the main reason not to apply exemption from the Resolution concerning agreements on minor importance is hardcore restraints.
THE SCHEME OF AGREEMENT ASSESSMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ITS IMPACT ON COMPETITION
The assessment of agreements between economic units in accordance with the significance of their impact on competition is conducted according to the following scheme: This scheme should also be applicable even in the case of hardcore restraints. 
HARDCORE RESTRAINTS AS A CONDITION WITHIN WHICH MARKET THRESHOLDS ARE NOT APPLIED
There is no doubt about the importance of market thresholds criteria.
However, according to current EU regulation it should be taken into account only when hardcore restraints have not been determined. Hardcore restraints are qualitative criteria assessing the agreement in accordance with its impact on competition. In other words, agreements should not contain any hardcore restraints in order to apply the exemption.
Certainly there is a downside and the de minimis Notice is criticized for its weak points 23 . For example, if two kiosks decide to fix prices it does not automatically mean that their decision will affect the competition significantly.
Customers and clients are free to choose other kiosks to satisfy their needs.
Nevertheless the 11 th point in current de minimis Notice provides us with a series of restraints which altogether can be defined as the blacklist: . If the parties of the agreement are very small there is no risk to distort competition significantly.
DEFINING A RELEVANT MARKET
If an agreement is concluded between two or more economic units which do not contain hardcore restraints, the assessment process should begin by defining a relevant market. "Market definition is a tool to identify and define the boundaries of competition between firms." 30 The definition of a relevant market has to be as accurate as possible.
Relevant market covers product market and geographic market
31
. Why is it necessary to define a relevant market? It allows us to distinguish concrete product and geographic markets where it is appropriate to complete the assessment.
Parties have their field of activity which is separated from other markets. In the case of a more extensive market, the probability is higher that the thresholds of parties in the market are smaller. It also means a higher probability to apply de minimis exemption.
To define the relevant market, these stages are to be taken: When assessing the demand, replaceability products that users consider as proper substitutes (according to their features, usage and price) are determined.
When assessing supply replaceability, other suppliers' reaction to changes made by the agreement should be determined. The market is defined as narrow, since the 29 Andrius Puksas, supra note 9: 46-69. 30 Notice (December 9, 1997) According to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in order to assess whether an agreement has an anti-competitive object, regard must be had to the content of the agreement, the objectives it seeks to attain, and the economic and legal context of which it forms part.
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Given the fact that each single agreement has an individual impact on competition, institutions carrying out assessment should determine the quantity of the effect. The quantitative criteria are the approach to achieve this goal.
There are no doubts that the agreement's effect on competition depends on its parties position in the market. Greater power in the market means higher risk that the agreement can be more harmful. The reverse situation also exists (lower power -lower risk -less harmful). It is more important to horizontal agreements which parties carry out activities at the same level. The quantitative criteria are based on presumptions which can be denied after the individual assessment.
During the assessment of horizontal agreement in accordance with Article 101
TFEU it is necessary to determine shares of the parties in the relevant market. The definition of appreciability covers both qualitative (for instance, fact of hardcore restraints) and quantitative (for example, market shares) criteria.
In order to define the parties' shares in the relevant market, we need to use: data about selling rates received from the parties; information on relevant market from other subjects; statistical analysis of the market; and other important data for assessment. 40 The most recent statistical data is important in order to determine changes and new tendencies in the market. Sometimes, when situations are similar, decisions made in previous cases can also be useful.
It is obvious that exceeding the provided 10 percent barrier cannot be a reason not to apply de minimis exemption unconditionally. The opposite situation is possible as well -even parties having less than 10 percent of the market share can conclude an agreement which will affect competition significantly. 
